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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
parison on any broad general market will relieve them of any liability under
the Act. The dissenting opinion appears more logical in applying reasoning
which excludes a comparison of cellophane with the whole flexible pack-
aging market. 21 A manufacturer who utilizes cellophane for his product
uses it because of the particular qualities which it, and no other material,
possesses. The adoption of this expanded rule amounts to a judicial nulli-
fication of the Sherman Act in this type of proceeding. The Sherman Act
was originally adopted to prevent anyone from using his size to unfair
advantage, and this decision does not seem consistent with that spirit.
EDGAR LEwIs
FEDERAL COURTS-JURISDICTION-
STATE REVENUE ACTS
Petitioner, a labor organizer, instituted an action in a federal district
court to enjoin the enforcement of a municipal ordinance imposing an
alleged exorbitant tax' on petitioner's activities. Held, the fcdcral prohi-
bition against interference with the tax-collecting procedure of a state2 is
removed when it is shown that there is no speedy and efficient remedy in
the courts of that state, and there exists a threat of genuine and irretrieveablc
loss. Denton v. City of Carrollton, 234 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1956).
The federal courts' recognition of the sovereign status of the severl
states has at all times been the motivation behind their reluctancy to inter-
fere with the fiscal procedures of a state 3
21. Id. at 423.
The majority opinion purports to reject the theory of "interindustry competi-
tion." Brick, steel, wood, cement and stone, it says, are "too different" to be
placed in the same market. But cellophane, glassine, wax papers, sulphite papers,
greaseproof and vegetable parchment papers, aluminum foil, cellulose acetate,
pliofilm and other films are not "too different", the opinion concludes. The
majority approach would apparently enable a monopolist of motion picture
exhibition to avoid Sherman Act consequences by showing that motion pictures
compete in substantial measure with legitimate theater, television, radio, sporting
events and other forms of entertainment. Here, too, "shifts of business" un-
doubtedly accompany fluctuations in price and "there are market alternatives
that buyers may readily use for their purposes.
1. Municipal Ordinance, City of Carrollton, Georgia:
An ordinance providing for a business license tax and per diem license for any
person conducting the business or occupation of labor union, union agent or
lbor union promoter or labor union organizer ...j . [T]he applicant shall pay a license tax in the amount of $1,000.00 and shall
thereafter deposit at the beginning of each twenty four hour period of each day
for each person engaged in any said activity the sum of $100.00 with the City
Clerk for the continuance of said license during said twenty four hour period.
There will be no proration of the initial license of $1,000.00.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1952). "The district court shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain
the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under state law where a plain, speedy and
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State."
3. Matthews v. Rogers, 284 U.S. 521 (1932).
CASENOTES
For reasons of public policy,4 federal courts have been slow to interfere
with the collection of public revenues.5 Except in a case that fell into one
of the recognized headings of equity jurisdiction,6 the federal courts did not
enjoin the enforcement of state revenue statutes. Whenever the question
was presented, the Supreme Court uniformly held, that the mere assertion
of illegality or unconstitutionality of a state or municipal tax is not of
itself grounds for equitable relief.7 If the remedy at law was plain, adequate
and complete, the aggrieved party was left to that remedy in the state
courts.8 However, if the legal remedy, even though provided by statute,9
was inadequate, the district court took jurisdiction for the purpose of grant-
ing injunctive relief.' That rule as adopted by The Judiciary Act of 1789,"1
was but a declaration of the established principle in equity, forbidding re-
course to the extraordinary remedies of equity where the right asserted
4. Dows v. Chicago, 78 U.S. (1 I Wall.) 108, 110 (1871):
. . . It is upon taxation that the several states chiefly rely to obtain the
means to carry on their respective governments, and it is of the utmost importance
to all of them that the modes adopted to enforce the taxes levied should be
interfered with as little as possible. Any delay . . . may delay the operations of
government, and thereby cause serious detriment to the public.
5. Boise Artesiam Hot & Cold Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U.S. 276, 282 (1909):
a proper reluctance [on the part of the federal courts] to interfere by
prevention with the operation of the state governments has caused it to refrain
from so doing in all eases where the Federal rights . . . could otherwise be pre-
served unimpaired.
6. Inadequate remedy at law: Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 284 U.S.
530 (1932); Matthews v. Rogers. 284 U.S. 521 (1932); Henrietta Mills v. Rutherford
County, 281 U.S. 121 (1930); Avoidance of multiplicity of suits: Raymond v. Chicago
Union Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20 (1907); accord, United States v. Osage County, 251
U.S. 128 (1919); danger of irreparable injury: Shelton v. Platt, 139 U.S. 591 (1891);
accord; Beal v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 312 U.S. 45 (1941) (although not involving a tax
statute or ordinance, the same general principle of equity was applied, denying an in-
junction where there was no clear showing that an injunction was necessary in order
to prevent irreparable injury); American Federation of Labor v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582
(1946); Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66 (1939).
7. Mathews v. Rogers, 284 U.S. 521 (1932); Boise Artesian Hot & Cold Water
Co. v. Boise City, 213 U.S. 276 (1909); Shelton v. Platt, 139 U.S. 591 (1891); Dows
v. Chicago, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 108 (1871). Accord: State Corp. Comm. v. Wichita
Gas Co.. 290 U.S. 561 (1933); Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'r; 286
U.S. 210 (1932) (although not involving a tax regulation, these cases concluded that
the mere unconstitutionality or invalidity of a state or municipal regulation was not a
sufficient ground to invoke the aid of a federal court of equity).
8. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Hoffman, 319 U.S. 293, 297 (1943):
Federal courts in the exercise of the sound discretion which guides them in
granting or withholding extraordinary relief in equity will not ordinarily restrain
state officers from collecting state taxes, where state law affords an adequate
remedy to the taxpayer.
See also, Garr Scott & Co. v. Shannon, 223 U.S. 468 (1912); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v.
O'Connor. 223 U.S. 280 (1912).
9. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., v. Schnader, 291 U.S. 24 (1934); Stewart Dry
Goods Co. v. Lewis, 287 U.S. 9 (1932); Chicago B. & G. Ry. v. Osborne, 265 U.S. 14
(1924); Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Daughton, 262 U.S. 413 (1923).
10. Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87 (1935); Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.S. 415
(1934).
11. 1 Stat. 82 § 16 (1789), 28 U.S.C. § 384 (1946), provided:
... That suits in equity shall not be sustained in the Federal courts in any case
where a plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law.
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could be protected at law." -' Congress gave further recognition and sanc-
tion to the practice of the federal equity courts by the Act of August 21,
1937.' a
It is against this background that the federal courts applied Section
1341 of the present Judiciary Code.' 4 Thus, it has been held, that where
a state provides by statute for the recovery of a tax paid under protest,
no injunction will issue.' However, the remedy at law has been held
inadequate where there has been no provision made for payment of interest
on the tax so refunded."' Mere inconvenience or expense to the taxpayer
will not constitute sufficient grounds for the granting of an injunction. 7
Nevertheless, in order for the remedy in the state court to deprive the
federal court of jurisdiction, there must not be any reasonable doubt as
to the existence of form or such remedy.'
In this field the collision between two doctrines is apparent. On one
hand, the desire of the Federal Government is to leave to the States the
right to exercise their fiscal policies without interference. On the other
hand, there is the necessity of securing to an individual protection of his
constitutional rights in the face of arbitrary action on the part of a state
or its political subdivisions. In the instant case, the court recognized the
restraint imposed upon their jurisdiction."' However, they reasoned, be-
cause of the largcess of the tax imposed coupled with the doubt existing
12. Deweese v. Reinhard, 165 U.S. 386, 389 (1897); New York Guaranty Co. v.
Memphis Water Co., 107 U.S. 205, 214 (1883).
13. 50 Stat. 738 (1937), 28 U.S.C. 41(1) (1946);
... [N]o district court shall have iurisdiction of any suit to enjoin, suspend or
restrain the assessment, levy, or collection of any tax imposed by or pursuant to
the laws of any state where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had at
law or equity in the courts of such state.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1952). "28 U.S.C. §1341 substantially carries forward the
Act of 1937 curtailing the jurisdiction of the federal district courts to enjoin the assess-
ment, levy or collection of state taxes." iMooire, COMMENTARY ON Til. U.S. JUDICIAL
ConFi 164 (1949).
15. McCaw v. Fase, 216 F.2d 698 (9th Cir. 1954 , cert. denied, 348 U.S. 927(1955). For other cases indicating circumstances where a plain speedy and efficient remedy
was available in the state courts see; George F. Alger Co. v. Peck, 119 F. Supp. 
812
(D.C. Ohio 1950), affd, 347 U.S. 984 (1954); Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Moley, 88
F. Supp. 300 (1.C. Ark. 1950); accord: Diggs v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'r.
180 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1950) (action by patrons of transportation system to restrain
increase in fares).
16. Mutt v. Ellerbe, 56 F.2d 1058, (D.C. S.C. 1932); Hess v. Mullaney, 189 F.2d
417, (9th Cir. 1951) (dictum, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 836 (1954).
17. George . Alger Co. v. Peck, 119 F. Stipp. 812 (D.C. Ohio 1950), aff'd, 347
U.S. 984 (1954) (Congress by Sec. 1341 left the burden on the taxpayer to follow the
required procedure rather than determine the federal issues primarily in the federal courts.).
18. George R.R. & Bkg. Co. v. Redwine, 346 U.S. 299 (1952) (where the remedy
provided applied only to part of the taxes paid, and where the petitioner had previously
been denied an injunction in the state court, and where an alternative procedure provided
by the state requiring the filing of 300 affidavits in 14 counties, there was no adequate
remedy available in the state courts); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Conner, 340 U.S.
602 (1951); Hillsboro Township v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1947); Spector Motor
Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944).
19. See note 2 supra.
CASENOTES
under state law20 as to the recoverability of any tax so paid, to require the
prepayment of the tax as a requisite to testing any substantial questions
involved, or to insist that the petitioner carry on his activities without the
required license and face the risk of penal sanctions, would be to place too
great a burden upon him. It was concluded that these considerations
eliminated the statutory prohibition and established sufficient threat of
irretrievable loss, so as to justify federal intervention. This decision is in
conformity with the established rule which provides that even though there
may be a remedy provided in the state, if it is inadequate, the petitioner
may seek relief in the federal courts. It was apparent that the respondent
attempted to restrict tile growth of labor unions in its city. The petitioner
had a right to engage in this activity. To insist that the peitioner seek the
remedy provided would effectively deprive him of this right. By deciding
that they had jurisdiction, the court arrived at the only just conclusion.
EDWARD S. JAFFRY
REAL PROPERTY-MECHANICS' LIENS-LIABILITY
OF LESSOR FOR LESSEE'S IMPROVEMENTS
A lessee under a long term lease caused inprovments to be made upon
the leased premises. Subsequently, the lessee was evicted owing to a breach
of conditions contained in the lease. Various mechanics' lienors sought to
20. "There is no general statute in Georgia affording a taxpayer a remedy for the
recovery of taxes illegally or erroneously assessed, except as herein before quoted fre-
ferring to GA. CoDE § 20-1007 (4317) (1933)]." State Revenue Comm. v. Alexander,
54 Ga. App. 295, 187 S.E. 707, 709 (1936). The petitioner's right to recover depends
completely on an interpretation and compliance with the Code of Georgia, supra,
providing:
Voluntary payments; recovery back-Payments of taxes or their claims, made
through ignorance of the law, or where the facts are all known and there is no
misplaced confidence and no artifice, deception or fraudulent practice used by
the other party, are deemed volintary, and cannot be recovered back, unless
made under an urgent and immediate lecCssity therefor, or to release a person
or property from detention, or to prevent an immediate seizure of person or
property. Filing a protest at the time of payment does not change this rule.
Thus, in Strachnan Shipping Co. v. Savannah, 168 Ga. 309, 147 S.E. 555 (1929),
it was held that payment of taxes through fear of criminal prosecution, where no warrants
had been issued and no prosecution commenced and there existed no demands or threats
by persons with the authority to carry them out, are voluntary and not recoverable. See
also Eibel v. Royal Indemnity Co., 50 Ga. App. 206, 177 S.E. 350 (1934) (where an
officer, not authorized to issue a warrant, notified the taxpayer that if he did not make
payment he would be arrested, and payment was made because of the threats, the pay-
ment was considered voluntary and not recoverable); Southern Stevedoring Co. v.
Savannah, 36 Ga. 526, 137 S.E. 123 (1927) (wherein it was held that an allegation in
taxpayer's petition that unless he paid the required occupation tax the city marshall would
be notified and plaintiff prosecuted, alleged only a mere possibility of prosecution, and
showed no immediate duress which would necessitate a payment in order to prevent
immediate seizure of person or property); accord, Goodwin v. McNeil, 188 Ga. 182, 3
S.E.2d 675 (1939) (a fine paid to avoid imprisonment after a conviction which was
later reversed, was held to be.a voluntary payment and not recoverable).
